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Abstract—Cloud Computing Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
is a great model for outsourcing IT infrastructure. It is built
to offer fascinating features to support business development,
such as elasticity, multi-tenancy, configurability and dynamicity.
However, IaaS faces security challenges on account of its flexible
nature. For this article, we studied the IaaS characteristics and
investigated their related security challenges. We then elaborated
these security challenges by exploring the security threats on live
virtual machine migration as it is one of the main IaaS operations.
We found that proper access control techniques and models are
a critical element in enhancing IaaS and mitigating the identified
security threats. Therefore, we investigated and contrasted the
implemented and the proposed firewall architectures in IaaS as a
firewall is a basic security appliance that enforces access control.
We also explored and contrasted the proposed access control
models in the IaaS. It was found that the traditional firewalls
and access control models were not sufficient for IaaS. Therefore,
there is a need to develop a proper access control model and
enforcement techniques to mitigate IaaS security threats. Based
on the security research trend and the results obtained in this
articles exploration, we endorse an IaaS access control system
built on a computational intelligent approach.
Keywords—IaaS; live virtual machine migration; access control;
firewall; security
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing emerges on a distributed computing
paradigm. It utilises the huge computing resources among
multiple customers with minimal expense and effort compared
to traditional computing facilities. Since Cloud Computing
emerged from a business perspective, the different clouds may
not be compatible with each other as they follow different
standards [1, 2]. Although Cloud Computing has incredible
benefits, some governments and enterprises hesitate to transfer
their computing technology to the Cloud due to security
aspects. Cloud computing services consist of three layers: at
the top, the Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud, which provides
software applications; the Platform as a Service (PaaS) cloud,
which provides programming language and needed libraries;
and at the bottom, the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), which
provides computing infrastructure resources. Cloud is deployed
via three main models: public where different customers (cloud
users) can share the cloud service, private where only one
organisation owns the cloud infrastructure and hybrid, where
the cloud combines public and private features[3].
The IDC survey shows that 75% of customers are not
tending to move to Cloud Computing because of the security
and privacy concerns [4]. Securing the IaaS layer is vital, as all
the other layers are built on top of it. In this article, we focus on
the security issues raised in the IaaS layer due to its features,
such as elasticity, dynamicity and its large scale. Based on
the authors best knowledge, this paper differs from other
research papers in the field by combining the identification of
security limitations of both the access control models and the
access control enforcement mechanisms in IaaS. We attempt
to give an understanding of the big picture of access control
component in the IaaS security architecture.
The aim of this paper is to identify those IaaS access control
security challenges and the approaches used to mitigate them.
Specifically, the following objectives are set for this research:
• Identify the security threads in IaaS that emerged from
its core features and explore the security issues related
to one of the IaaS services operations, namely live
virtual machine migration.
• Investigate limitations of the well-known network ac-
cess control enforcement mechanisms in IaaS, which
are firewall and VLAN.
• Explore the limitations of the proposed access control
model approaches in IaaS.
On the view of computer security systems, the IaaS security
requirements based on its characteristics are defined in Section
II. Then, the security of live virtual machine migration opera-
tion as an example of IaaS operations is identified in Section
III. IaaS firewall as an access control enforcement mechanism
is investigated in Section IV. IaaS access control models are
explored in Section V. An overall discussion is presented in
Section VI with a recommended approach to mitigating access
control limitation in IaaS. Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. SECURITY CHALLENGES OF
INFRASTRUCTURE AS A SERVICE
The characteristics of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
encouraged ICT customers to adopt it as the next generation
model for outsourcing IT infrastructure [5]. IaaS is capable
of controlling and managing the virtualised environment
represented in a virtual machine life circle by providing the
virtual machine (VM) with the requested resources, such as
storage, network and processing power [6].
IaaS features offer business advantages, such as rapid elasticity
and fast resource pooling, since IaaS deploys virtualisation
technology which supports several innovations, such as
multi-core chips and live migrations [7]. A key component in
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building a virtualisation environment is to operate it via the
hypervisor, although the hypervisor on its own cannot build
IaaS. Therefore, a cloud-stack is required to build IaaS, such
as OpenStack, CloudStack and OpenNebula. According to the
current industry, OpenStack is likely to become a dominant
cloud-stack [1].
On the other hand, the flexibility characteristics of IaaS
introduce several security challenges linked to access control
implementation.
The elasticity feature of IaaS allows the cloud user
(customer) to scale up and scale down to meet their
project requirements. This leads to a rapid change in the
infrastructure configurations. However, elasticity introduces
security challenges in respect to providing an administrative
separation between the customers virtual environments.
There is a need for a security mechanism that enforces a
proper configuration and change management, as well as a
fine-grained and predefined access control mechanism [8].
The multitenant nature of IaaS which facilitates the ideal
usage of infrastructure by sharing resources between multiple
users faces some security challenges as well [1]. Therefore, it
is more likely that there is a need for a new type of access
control policy between tenants in intra-cloud communication
[9]. A tenant can be an enterprise in the context of a public
cloud or a department within an enterprise in the context of a
private cloud [10].
The flexibility feature of IaaS enables the user to configure
their own virtual machines and computing infrastructure [11].
Hence, it is prone to misconfiguration that can lead to a
security violation [12]. Therefore, there is a need to monitor
cloud behaviour to figure out unexpected errors. For example,
in April 2011 an infrastructure outage caused Amazons
Compute Cloud EC2 to be unavailable for its customers
[13]. Therefore, there is a need to monitor IaaS behaviour. In
the literature, an approach constructed on role-based access
control has been proposed [14].
The dynamicity of IaaS facilitates virtual machine (VM)
mobility among physical machines for different aspects,
such as server consolidation, load balancing, data recovery
and green computing, through a technique called live
virtual machine migration (LVMM). The LVMM allows the
movement of virtual machines between the physical machines
at the run time with a minimum downtime [15]. Although
live migration supports IaaS dynamicity, it introduces some
security threats. The protocol used for live migration moves
the virtual machine state in plain text, which allows hackers
to snoop it through the network links. Even encryption is not
able to secure it, as illustrated experimentally [16]. Therefore,
there is a need for re-thinking the existing access control and
isolation mechanism.
Moreover, the dynamicity feature of IaaS affects firewall
functionality since the VM gets a dynamic IP address through
a DHCP server that assigns a lease time for the client IP
address. The virtual machine must renew its IP address when
the lease time expires. Upon renewing its IP address, it
may or may not receive the same IP address that it received
previously [17]. A source IP address and a destination IP
address are basic information to generate a firewall rule. The
firewall rules remain constant unless there is an explicit need
to change the policy as a result the firewall cannot adapt to
real-time threats [18]. Any system that uses predetermined
and fixed IPs might impose some limitation on the dynamism
and the scalability of IaaS [19].
Fig. 1: Recommended mitigation for some of IaaS security
challenges
A firewall is a critical network access control mechanism,
therefore it will be discussed in more detail in Section IV.
The above IaaS security challenges analysis shows that there
are several security vulnerabilities occurring as a side effect
of the substantial IaaS characteristics. Fig. 1 reveals that
a proper design and implementation of access control is a
critical element that can contribute to mitigating the majority
of the security IaaS challenges.
The remaining sections of this article will identify the
limitations of the traditional network access control
enforcement mechanisms which are firewall and VLAN.
Then it will explore the existing access control models
and investigate their ability to accommodate IaaS security
requirements.
As an example of IaaS operations, live virtual machine
migration (LVMM) operation is explored since LVMM can
reflect most of the essential IaaS characteristics. The LVMM
security challenges are raised as a consequence of elasticity,
multi-tenancy, configurability and dynamicity.
III. LIVE VIRTUAL MACHINE MIGRATION
SECURITY CHALLENGES
The IaaS layer consists of several components, such
as virtualization, networking, storage and processing.
Virtualisation is one of the key components; furthermore,
the main core services in IaaS are Virtual Machine (VM)
provisioning and VM migration [7]. Security of LVMM is
considered one of the major challenges in IaaS and a critical
research topic [7, 20–22].
There is a default LVMM algorithm in most popular
hypervisors, such as Xen, VMWare and KVM [23]. A typical
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LVMM mechanism consists of four main stages, as shown in
Fig. 2 , which start with several iterations that aim to transfer
VM memory pages from the source physical machine to the
destination, where a new location for VM has been selected.
Fig. 2: LVMM Process Steps [24]
The ideal migration process is to copy the complete state
of the VM, including memory, disk and network connection
[23]. From a networking point of view, there are two categories
of LVMM: moving VMs belonging to the same sub-network
and moving VMs between different sub-networks. The latter
requires a change of IP address and introduces another chal-
lenge that limits migration in cloud computing [25].
LVMM has been penetrated via man-in-the-middle attacks, as
well as successfully attacked by through flag migration [16,
26, 27]. LVMM introduces important security issues because
it includes VM state transfer through communication links,
which can be attacked by ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing and
route Hijacking [28]. Live Virtual Machine Migration (LVMM)
security vulnerabilities are related to the security exposures in
virtualisation technology [21, 28–33]. The following illustrates
LVMM vulnerabilities, which have been categorised into three
sources of threat, as follows:
• The first vulnerability is through the network link, as
live migration involves a lot of network state transfer.
Encryption techniques can be involved in mitigating
this risk, but there should be a careful consideration
of downtime since LVMM runs in real time. IPsec
has been used in some security approaches to mitigate
live migration threats, hence it introduces a huge
computational delay [34, 35]. Moreover, encryption
is not able completely to mitigate this security hole
[16].
• The second vulnerability is through the host (physical
machine), where it can be attacked or it can host an
untrustworthy VM. As a consequence, the migrated
VM security can be compromised since it will be
in a shared environment with malicious components.
Attacks can also be initiated in migrated VMs through
the hypervisor if its corresponding host has been
successfully compromised.
• The third vulnerability is based on security configura-
tion consistency and efficiency. This is as a result of
the different natures of physical appliances and virtual
appliances, such as a firewall. This vulnerability oc-
curs due to various factors, such as firewall placement
and the policy configurations [36]. Moreover, elasticity
introduces security flaws caused by misconfiguration
after a migration is triggered [37]. Network state
consistency can also be affected after migration where
some network packets might be lost during LVMM
downtime [38].
To sum up, LVMMs main security issues arise as a
consequence of an environment shared between different
customers (cloud users), which is a multi-tenancy feature
of IaaS, as well as dynamicity and elasticity features which
raise the need to update access control policies as the virtual
machine changes its location. We can conclude that LVMM
security is a critical issue in IaaS and it faces serious security
challenges that need to be addressed and considered as an
open research topic.
There is a trend to secure LVMM through vTPM [39].
Nevertheless, TPM-based measurements are ineffective for
detecting a malicious cloud service provider as well as having
limitations in verifying the hypervisor integrity in public
clouds via remote attestation [40].
To secure LVMM, there is a need to design an access control
policy that allows the administrator to manage migration
privileges. The existing access control model in IaaS should be
upgraded to cope with the emerging security challenges [16].
Similarly, existing firewall approaches should be modified to
meet IaaS characteristics.
IV. IAAS FIREWALL SYSTEM
IaaS dynamicity and rapid infrastructure changes, due to
adding and removing virtual machines and virtual machine
migration, introduce a challenge to the firewall as there is
a need to update firewall entries frequently. This leads to
increasing maintenance overheads as firewall policies need to
be updated in such large scale environment [9]. If the firewall
is not well constructed, managed and updated, the IaaS will
be at risk, resulting in facilitating for hackers the access to the
cloud interface on behalf of legitimate users [40, 41].
A. Security Group
A firewall system is a critical network access control
enforcement mechanism in most computing environments. A
Cloud service provider (CSP) provides a firewall functionality
in the form of a security group. For example, Amazon,
Windows Azure and OpenStack implement the concept of
the security group to provide a firewalling service to their
customers.
In general, the security groups are set to deny everything by
default and individual services must be enabled by the client.
The security group allows customers to restrict traffic to and
from their VMs. All VMs which belong to the same security
group will have the same firewall policy [1].
This makes a cloud firewall service relatively user-friendly, but
it lacks many of the features commonly found on local fire-
wall products [42]. The security groups alone are insufficient
to prevent attackers from communicating with the external
network [43]. There are two methods of setting up firewall
policy through security group: either to create an entry for
each VM in the security group or to group VMs in one entry
based on their IP prefix. The first method faces scalability
limitations in IaaS, while the second method complicates VM
address management [9]. Therefore, Cloud can bring some
potential security threats to the organisation by not having an
organisation specific firewall [44].
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B. IaaS firewall security threats and limitations
As IaaS provides several features that introduce flexibility
into the cloud infrastructure, it initiates complexity in firewall
configuration and installation. Due to the large scale of IaaS
infrastructure, a simple policy can lead to a large number of
fine-grained rules [45].
The effectiveness of firewall security depends on its policies.
However, firewall policies are often error prone due to the
complex nature of firewall configurations as well as the
lack of systematic analysis mechanisms and tools [46]. In a
distributed environment, detecting anomalies in firewalls has
become a complex task [47]. According to an empirical study
of middle-box failures over two years in a service provider
network, it was found that firewalls crash more than other
security systems, such as IPDS and VPN, and that 33% of
firewall failures are due to misconfiguration, faulty failovers
and software version mismatch [48]. Therefore, the firewall
policy management area is an evolving research field, as
policy correctness and consistency among firewall systems is
an essential element for enhancing firewall security [49, 50].
To get a cloud firewall policy configuration pattern, intensive
experiments are needed to make security policy complete
[51].
Therefore, several researchers are concerned with improving
firewall policy strategies; for example, the Tree-Rule firewall,
which uses the NF-IP-FORWARD algorithm to improve the
performance of firewalls in cloud policy configurations [52].
Another main problem with firewalls in cloud computing is
their placement; too few firewalls can cause a large number
of communication flows. The placement of firewalls in cloud
computing is critical in maximising the security benefits they
offer. Traditional firewall placement is not sufficient in cloud
computing, as it will introduce traffic overhead to the network
switches and hypervisors [45].
A major network security risk in cloud computing is due to
the limits of traditional firewall connections [53]. Traditional
firewall settings are not sufficient for optimal fine-grained
decisions and application-level as they are not able to
deal with dynamically opened server ports for encrypted
connections [54].
Several researches consider firewalls and VLAN to be less
effective in the cloud environment, as a consequence for time
consuming in configuration and management, limitation of
the geographic zones, limitation to the number of users and
static nature [9, 19, 38, 55].
The firewalls can be breached in cloud environments by
a mechanism using UDP coordinating with TCP [56]. An
analytical experiment shows that there is a time interval where
LVMM is not under firewall protection. A firewall cannot
differentiate normal traffic from attack traffic if it accesses
the network through port 80 [57]. Moreover, 42% of firewall
failures are due to DDoS attack at the network layer [48].
Traditional packet-level firewall mechanisms are not suitable
for cloud platforms in cases of complex attacks [58].
The limitations of firewall configuration in cloud comput-
ing according to this investigation are summarised in Fig.
3. We can notice that traditional access control enforcement
mechanisms are not sufficient in cloud computing. Therefore,
there is a need to redesign a firewall system that suits IaaS
characteristics.
Fig. 3: IaaS firewall limitations
C. IaaS firewall approaches
Cloud users, such as companies and governments, might
not rely on cloud-based firewalling approaches as these ap-
proaches still experience severe performance and reliability
issues [59].
Ensuring network security in the current complex infrastructure
which involves different vendors and cloud service providers
(CSP) turns out to be difficult and time-consuming. Each CSP
has their own API to manage the security mechanisms, such
as traditional firewalls, virtual firewalls and security tools.
Therefore, what looks like a simple application change may
require tens or even hundreds of configurations [60].
As shown by Table 1, IaaS firewall approaches from the liter-
ature agree that the traditional firewall needs to be improved
or replaced in order to cope with the IaaS environment. A
trend of deploying virtual firewall is illustrated in most of
the approaches. The firewall virtualisation allows dynamic de-
ployment, so it suits IaaS characteristics and it can effectively
improve firewall configuration [59, 61].
Most of the academic research assumes that the insiders in
cloud service providers are not trusted [1, 18, 44]. To improve
the trust in the cloud environment, a bridge virtual firewall
can be designed and installed on the virtual machine in IaaS
so that the cloud user can have full control on their firewall
[44]. Bridge firewall improves the performance, but it limits
the security of the live migration as this type of firewall cannot
manage different types of policies. Moreover, massive attacks
may compromise virtual firewall if they originate from outside
the virtual domain [59].
The virtual firewall side effect can be mitigated if a proper
firewall is designed among virtual machines and suitable
firewall policies are defined [51].
Table 1 indicates the two approaches discussed regarding
firewall systems administration in IaaS, which are centralised
and distributed. The centralised approach was found to be less
prone to misconfiguration failure as it monitored continually
[48].
On the other hand, it has several drawbacks: it may lead the
centralised controller to reach a bottleneck, it attracts more
DDoS attacks and can introduce a single point of failure [9].
The centralised firewall set-up is argued to be unfeasible in
the cloud due to performance and cost issues [62].
The distributed approach is used by many enterprises on the
network edge [45]. To handle dynamic policy update in IaaS,
a distributed firewall needs a complicated revocation and re-
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propagation mechanism [63].
TABLE I: Firewall approaches in dynamic network
Ref. Main problem Proposed solution Admin type
[9] Conventional
network
access contorl:
firewall
and VLAN
face several
limitation in
IaaS
Take the
policy en-
forcement
point out
from the
network
and place
it into the
hypervisor
Centralised
[63] Network states
and traffic
are frequently
changed
Firewall
Frame-
work
to cope
up with
SDN en-
virnomnt
Centralised
[45] fine-grained
rules are
needed by
CSP to get
better control
over individual
network flows
For better
scalability
and per-
formance,
place the
access
control
policy
on both
hypervisor
and switch
Centralised
[59] Cloud
firewalling
suffers from
performance
and reliability
issues
Propose a
framework
consisting
of phyical
firewall
and virtual
firewall
Centralised
[58] Packet level
firewall
mechanisism
can not handle
a complex
attack on the
cloud
Cloud
firewall
framework
involves
event level
detection
chain with
dynamic
resource
allocation
Not
mentioned
continued on next column
Ref. Main problem Proposed solution Admin type
[18] Network
topology is not
well defined,
insiders are
not trusted.
Policies in
Conventional
firewalls are
static and
can not adapt
to real-time
threats
Propose a
distributed
firewall
with a
distributed
active
response
by moving
policy en-
forcement
point from
network
firewall to
end host
Distributed
[44] CSP is not
fully trusted
Propose
a firewall
system
monitored
by the
cloud
customers
Distributed
V. IAAS ACCESS CONTROL
The big picture of information security involves four issues:
access to the system, secure communication, security manage-
ment and development of secure information [64].Therefore,
secure access is a critical element in building the overall
security system.
Furthermore, the security techniques used in cloud can
be classified into six based on the implemented security
mechanism: encryption, signature, Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS)/Intrusion Preventions System (IPS), access control,
authentication and trusted computing [65]. Thus, the access
control is one of the basic security techniques in any computing
system.
Authentication, access control, and audit together provide
the foundation for information and system security. Conse-
quently, access control is applied after authentication has been
established [66]. In cloud computing, the authentication tech-
nique is fulfilled through identity management that supports
access control based on user attributes [67]. Vaquero studied
several virtualised (multitenant) datacentres and concluded that
most reported systems employed access control techniques to
secure their environment [19]. Fig. 4 illistrated that access
control is one of the core elements in the big picuter of the
information and systems security.
As has been discussed in IaaS security challenges in
this article, it was found that an appropriate access control
mechanism is needed to mitigate most of the explored threats.
Unfortunately, the classical access control models such as
mandatory, discretionary and role-based are not suitable for
IaaS due to its characteristics [68–70].
Several attributes should be taken into consideration to set
up proper access control for the cloud environment [9, 71, 72].
These are:
• The method of access to the cloud and cloud ar-
chitecture. The users in the cloud are identified by
their attributes or their characteristics, not by fixed
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Fig. 4: Access control in security body
IP address. Therefore, a dynamic access control is
needed to achieve cross-domain authentication. The
cloud access control should be network independence.
• The multi-tenancy feature in IaaS requires flexibility in
seating access policy as different users are sharing the
same infrastructure, although they are most probably
not from the same organisation or country.
TABLE II: Access Control Approaches in IaaS
Ref. Main problem Proposed solution
[73] Cloud server and the data
owner are not in the same
trusted domain, so server
can not enforce access
policy
Fine-grained attribute-
based access controls
mechanism
[12] Obtain virial recources in
a secure manner
Propose attribute-based
constraints specification
and enforcement
[10] Multi-tenancy risks that
arise in cloud IaaS
Attribute-based
constraints specification
and enforcement
mechanism
[74] Need to facilitate secure
sharing between tenants
Propose access control
models for secure in-
formation and resource
sharing
continued on next column
Ref. Main problem Proposed solution
[69] Traditional access con-
trol model such as MAC,
DAC and RBAC are not
suitable for cloud
a framework based on the
dynamic trustworthiness
of users
[75] Need for unified access
control and authorisation
of IaaS clouds
Propose a hybrid access
control framework,
named iHAC, which
combines the advantages
of both Role-based
Access Control (RBAC)
and Type Enforcement
(TE) model
[68] Classical access control
models are not suff-
cient for dynamic envi-
ronments such as cloud
An approach called
CatBAC (CategoryBased
Access Control ), for
building dedicated
access control models
starting from an abstract
meta-model.
[76] Ill-suited for addressing
multifarious security
breaches in the cloud
Proposes dynamic access
control basid on seman-
tic context-aware access
control architecture
Table 2 summarises several IaaS access control approaches.
The access control models based on the attribute are rec-
ommended by several researchers [10, 12, 70, 73]. On the
other hand, it was claimed by Khamadja [68] that even the
attribute-based model is not sufficient for cloud computing.
Moreover, even identity-based security cannot be used in an
open cloud computing environment [71]. The access control
model used by most commercial clouds is the role-base model
(Amazon, Verizon, Racspace, DimansionData) and the sub-
users model (Joyent, Fujitsu, Softlayer, HP) while Google has
its own model via OAuth2 [1].
VI. DISCUSSION AND OPEN RESEARCH
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is a trend for infras-
tructure outsourcing. Its flexible characteristics add great ben-
efits in deploying and managing resources from a business
perspective. On the other hand, IaaS infrastructure brings
with it several security challenges as it changes frequently,
is shared among different customers, enables virtual machine
configuration and allows virtual machine to move easily. As an
example, for IaaS operations, live virtual machine migration
(LVMM) can be attacked through the network link or through
the physical host or even as a result of inconsistent policy
configurations.
To mitigate these security challenges, a proper access
control model and an enforcement mechanism are essential to
enhance IaaS security. In this paper, the firewall as an access
control enforcement mechanism is explored and the access
control models for cloud computing are investigated. Through
this investigation, it has been observed that the firewall faces
several limitations in the cloud environment and even the
firewall service offered by commercial clouds in form of
security group has limited functionalities.
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The finding illustrates that cloud firewall system should
offer flexibility to the customer in addition to an acceptable
level of trust. The virtual firewall as well adds an advantage
to IaaS if it is designed and implemented accurately to be
aligned with IaaS characteristics. The cloud firewall should
also be built on a suitable access control policy to alleviate
the security challenges faced by IaaS.
The centralised and the distributed administration ap-
proaches for a firewall system offer some useful gains along-
side their limitations. We can point out that the distributed
administrations approach for firewall looks to be more effective
than the centralized one in the IaaS environment.
Researchers have proposed several approaches to putting
forward a cloud firewall system. However, academic re-
searchers recommend to take access control out of the network
and place it in the hypervisor, basically into the host [9, 18,
75].
Moreover, the traditional access control models are not
adequate for implementation in the cloud environment. Re-
searchers have proposed several cloud access controls, but still
some commercial clouds deploy a classic role-based access
control model. Therefore, it is recommended to perform a
thorough exploration on the proposed access control to come
up with an improved model that is suitable for IaaS and can
attract the commercial cloud to deploy it.
We recommend employing an intelligence security ap-
proach in implementing and monitoring the access control
in IaaS to respond to the challenges faced by traditional
firewalls and access control models. Intelligence security is a
fertile approach, as most of the existing security paradigms
suffer from reactive and fragmented approaches [77]. The
cloud service provider may become a convenient candidate
for offering security intelligence [78]. In a frequently changing
infrastructure, it will be an advantage to deploy an agent-based
mechanism [13].
VII. CONCLUSION
We have investigate access control in Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS) which covers enforcement techniques based on
firewall and implemented access control models. It has been
found that traditional firewall and access control mechanisms
are not appropriate to enhance the security of IaaS due to
cloud-specific characteristics which differ from regular data
centres by providing an elasticity, multi-tenancy, configurabil-
ity and dynamicity infrastructure. Ultimately, we endorse the
use of computational intelligence for improving the proposed
models and mechanisms to cope with this new computing
environment provided by IaaS.
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